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Abstract
Structural asymmetric first-price auction estimation methods have provided numerous empirical studies.
However, due to the latent nature of underlying valuations, the accuracy of estimates is not feasibly testable
with field data, a fact that could inhibit empirical auction market designs and applications based on structural
estimates. To assess their accuracy, we provide an analysis of estimates derived from experimental asymmet-
ric auction data, in which researchers observe valuations. We test the null of statistical equivalence between
the estimated and true value distributions against the alternative of non-equivalence. When advanced mod-
els are used, the Modified Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the distributional equivalence, supporting
structural asymmetric auction estimations for auction market studies. In addition, recovered efficiencies have
plus-minus 2.5 percent precision, compared to the true efficiencies.
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1 Introduction
Structural studies of asymmetric auction markets based on estimated valuations have attracted many eco-
nomic researchers, as well as auction market practitioners, yet the accuracy of estimated valuations is still
unexplained. By investigating estimates derived from experimental auction data, in which researchers observe
laboratory-assigned valuations, and by statistically testing the equivalence between estimated and observed
valuations, this study contributes to the literature by reporting the performance of asymmetric first-price
auction estimates based on semi and nonparametric methods.
The empirical and structural study of auction markets for allocating scarce resources is a successful area
in economics; numerous empirical findings on auction theory have been reported in the last twenty years. In
the literature, researchers are interested in understanding strategic interactions among bidders for designing
auction markets based on economic incentives. Initially, linear regression models were used, although their
use for analyzing bidders’ non-linear payoff-maximization problems was a challenge in describing strategic
behavior. In order to overcome this difficulty, semi and nonparametric structural estimation methods arose
and, for the last twenty years, have been widely used for investigating market-design implications.1 One of
the advantages is that researchers are also able to recover the structural elements of auction theory, such as
bidders’ private valuations and payoff functions. Accordingly, counterfactual market-design analyses, includ-
ing market efficiency assessments, have become possible. In addition, due to the pervasiveness of asymmetry
among bidders, the estimation methods have also been extended to asymmetric auctions. As a result, asym-
metric auction estimates are now the vital foundation of auction market research for addressing positive and
normative questions.
However, while more and more asymmetric first-price auction estimates are reported in the literature, there
is a fundamental difficulty in evaluating the performance of these estimates. In structural studies, researchers
use econometric methods based on theoretical auction models, in which they can use observed bids to estimate
bidders’ valuations, as valuations are not directly observed in empirical first-price auctions. The latent nature
of bidders’ valuations makes comparison between estimated and true valuations infeasible. In addition, most
of the auction estimation methods provide few testable frameworks for enabling empirical researchers to ex-
amine the modeling assumptions. Such an infeasible comparison and the lack of testability could then foster
divided views on empirical auction estimates. Specifically, there are two major kinds of adverse views. The
1The cornerstone of empirical and structural first-auction literature should be credited. To the best of our knowledge, the
literature was initiated by the Ph.D. thesis of Paarsch (1992) with parametric models. Donald and Paarsch (1993) Donald and
Paarsch (1996), Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel, and Vuong (1994), and Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) established statistically
rigorous yet flexible parametric estimation methods. The survey of Hickman, Hubbard, and Sağlam (2012) concisely summarizes
the literature, while that of Gentry, Hubbard, Nekipelov, and Paarsch (2018) provides a longer treatment of developments in the
structural econometrics of auctions.
2
first is made by a group of robust mechanism design researchers who have a skeptical view on bidders’ ability
to find Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), especially in asymmetric auctions. The second view comes from
a group of applied researchers who contend that assumptions made for structural analyses are implausibly
strong.
Against such adverse views, Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005) provide a concrete and focused response by using
symmetric first-price auction data from a laboratory study, in which researchers observe experimentally-
assigned true valuations. By using the valuations assigned in the experiment as a benchmark, they compare
the estimates generated by various structural models with semiparametric estimation methods. Their anal-
yses show that estimates based on the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) model can recover the
distributions of latent valuations in symmetric auctions with a statistically acceptable degree of accuracy, at
least in (but not limited to) a laboratory environment. This demonstrates the great potential of structural
auction estimation methods. The current study contributes to the empirical auction literature by extending
the symmetric first-price auction research of Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005) to asymmetric bidders and nonpara-
metric payoff function estimation models.
By observing field auctions, we can find numerous situations where the symmetric auction assumption limits
the scope of empirical investigations, and where asymmetric auction structural estimation models are essen-
tial. In fact, the majority of empirical auction studies reported for the last decade use asymmetric auction
models for estimating latent valuations.2 Such estimated asymmetric valuations are, in turn, used for deriving
market design policy implications, supported by structural counterfactual simulations. Thus, examining the
accuracy of estimated asymmetric valuations is vital for achieving policy goals, such as the improvement of
market efficiencies and an increase in revenues.
Given the ubiquity of asymmetry among bidders in field auctions and the challenges reported in the develop-
ment of theoretical asymmetric auction studies, it is our belief that investigating the precision of asymmetric
auction estimates and suggesting improvements is a valuable contribution to the literature. Following the
precedent set by Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005), we use laboratory data, which are able to provide insights on
the quality of estimates.3 Both strengths and shortcomings are directly gauged with laboratory data, and
2The incomplete list of the sources of asymmetries and studies are: firm-size (Marion 2007, also as indicated by Laffont et al.
1995), joint bids (Hendricks and Porter 1992 and Campo et al. 2003), capacity constraints (Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2003 and
Balat 2012), collusive behaviors (Porter and Zona 1999, Pesendorfer 2000, Bajari and Ye 2003, and Asker 2010), asymmetric infor-
mation (Hendricks and Porter 1988 and Hendricks et al. 1994), bid preference (Krasnokutskaya and Seim 2011, and aforementioned
Marion 2007), bidder experience (De Silva et al. 2003 and Campo 2012), and geographic locations (Flambard and Perrigne 2006).
In addition, Cantillon (2008) emphasizes the importance in modeling bidder asymmetry for investigating expected revenues.
3Ertaç, Hortaçsu, and Roberts (2011) and Salz and Vespa (2015) also use experimental data for structural estimations. Specif-
ically, in the first study, the authors exploit a unique experiment structure, which includes both first and second price auctions,
and investigate the entry behavior into auctions. In the second study, the authors evaluate parameter recoveries and counterfactual
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such findings are essential for extending the capability of asymmetric auction market studies. In addition,
to the best of our knowledge, a direct evaluation of asymmetric auction estimates has not been previously
reported in the literature.
Specifically, by exploiting the experimental data and by comparing the true and estimated valuations, we
evaluate auction estimates, which are inevitably affected by a combination of factors: (1) bidders’ ability to
behave as prescribed by the BNE and (2) the flexibility of econometric methods which are built upon the
BNE. (1) and (2) are distinguishable only when we assume full rationality among all bidders, which may not
be guaranteed in empirical studies. However, our experimental comparisons reveal that the proposed auction
estimation methods are capable of recovering true valuations, even without a full rationality assumption, and
with asymmetry among bidders.
Moreover, there are behavioral concerns regarding the asymmetric framework. The asymmetric auction
theory places multiple requirements on bidders’ behavior and their cognitive ability: each bidder not only
behaves in a payoff-maximizing rational manner but also recognizes that rival bidders behave in the same
fashion. Furthermore, bidders understand rival bidders’ asymmetric bidding behavior and make asymmetric
best responses, finding an asymmetric fixed point in a functional space. Given the existence of behavioral
bidders, who may not follow the theoretical prescription and the intricacy of asymmetric best responses, a
deliberate investigation is required for verifying whether estimated asymmetric valuations closely approxi-
mate true valuations.
In this study, we look at the performance of asymmetric first-price auction estimation methods introduced by
Isabelle Perrigne, Quang Vuong, and their co-authors. Due to their versatility in allowing asymmetry in value
distributions and computational tractablity, these methods are now the standard used by empirical works for
investigating auction markets. We study the precision of estimates derived by the semi and nonparametric
estimation methods for asymmetric auctions with an exogenous variation in an auction environment.4
Specifically, we use a dataset from the asymmetric private value first-price auctions experiment conducted by
Chernomaz (2012). The data contains bids and laboratory-assigned valuations for each bidder. Additionally,
Chernomaz (2012) investigates the effects caused by asymmetry among bidders under exogenously changing
auction environments, while the majority of bidder valuations remain fixed before and after such exogenous
predictions of Markov-perfect dynamic oligopoly models.
4The history is as follows: based on the cornerstone work of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) that proposes a nonparametric
method for symmetric first-price auctions with risk neutral bidders, Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003) extend the nonparametric
estimation method to asymmetric auctions. In addition, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009) and Campo, Guerre, Perrigne, and
Vuong (2011) broaden the estimation method to allow risk averse preferences among bidders with semi and nonparametric payoff
functions.
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changes. Our estimation strategy takes advantage of the exogenous changes in auction environments to iden-
tify bidders’ payoff functions and underlying value distributions, as bid distributions vary before and after the
exogenous change, while the valuations that bidders hold remain unchanged. We construct, then estimate,
the compatibility conditions derived by connecting first-order conditions of the payoff maximization problems
before and after the exogenous auction environment change.
We test the null hypothesis of accurate valuation estimates that are derived from structural asymmetric
auction models (using various estimation methods of payoff functions) against the alternative of inaccurate
valuations. Distributional equivalence tests compare the true and structurally estimated value distributions.
The primary analytic methodology employed in our research follows Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005). However,
we extend their analyses in two empirically important ways.5 The first extension is that we investigate asym-
metric value distributions among bidders and associated market efficiency. The second extension is that, in
addition to the semi-parametric models, we investigate the recently developed nonparametric payoff functions
that allow the greatest degree of flexibility in modeling of bidders’ risk preferences.
Our study is different from, but complements Monte-Carlo simulation evaluations. Using simulated bids
is an established approach for testing the validity of those estimation methods. The limitation of simulations
is that all sources of uncertainty and all parameters are controlled by researchers, and full rationality of
bidders is built into the simulation. Thus, the usefulness of the results to empirical studies is limited by the
ability of the researcher to imitate human error. On the other hand, experimental data offers an additional
opportunity where some aspects are controlled (i.e. valuations) while other aspects are not controlled (i.e.
risk preferences and the degree of rationality in behavior). Experimental data is much noisier with uncon-
trollable error distributions, compared to simulated data. Using data generated by human behavior puts
these methods to a more challenging test. Exposing the methods to such noisy environments helps us better
understand the strengths and limitations of these proposed econometric methods. We show that we can still
recover a valuation distribution close enough to the true one, despite these challenges. We also show that it
is not a straightforward task, and that only after estimating the shape of the utility function are we able to
achieve the result. The empirical implication is that these econometric methods can be used in applications
where the full rationality of bidders is debatable. However, we show that an additional source of exogenous
variation can be a great help for the successful recovery of valuations.
Based on comparisons between estimated and true private valuations, we report these main conclusions:
(1) the risk neutral model assumption, which is often made for simplicity in the literature, tends to inflate
5 Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005) also conduct the analyses of Adaptive Learning and Quantal Response Models. We exclude these
models from this research as they have rarely been used in empirical auction literature, although we recognize that these models
have intriguing aspects for understanding bidding behavior.
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estimated valuations in an asymmetric auction environment; (2) the assumption of risk averse bidders is indis-
pensable in empirical asymmetric auction research, as it enables nonnegligible improvements in the accuracy
of estimates; (3) among semi and nonparametric models with risk aversion, the nonparametric model with
shape restrictions based on conventional wisdom provides the most accurate results;6 (4) when advanced risk
averse models are employed, the Modified Kolmogoro-Smirnov test fails to reject the statistical equivalence
between the estimated and true value distributions, supporting the findings reported in the empirical asym-
metric auction literature; and (5) derived market efficiency based on structural estimates falls in plus-minus
2.5 percent range from the true efficiency, indicating the potential of structural asymmetric auction estimates
for assessing market efficiency.
Lastly, the inherent limitations of our research should be noted. As our research uses data from experimental
auctions, bidders’ behavior could potentially be different from that observed in field auctions. Consequently,
our results should be interpreted with caveats regarding the difference between field and experimental auc-
tions.7 On this point, we will provide detailed explanations of external validity in the conclusion section. Also,
the cause of asymmetry investigated in this research is joint bidding, one of the many forms of asymmetries
reported in the literature, and cautious interpretation is required for extending our results to other forms
of asymmetric auctions. These limitations notwithstanding, the findings reported in this research provide
support for the empirical analyses of asymmetric auction markets that are recently reported in the literature.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental data that contains
both valuation and bid observations; Section 3 explains the theoretical auction models that are the basis for
the structural estimations; Section 4 describes the semi and nonparametric asymmetric auction estimation
methods that are used to generate estimates; Section 5 provides the estimation results, reports the results of
distributional equivalence tests, and describes recovered market efficiency; and lastly, Section 6 discusses the
external validity and provides conclusions.
6We employ the nonparametric sieve estimation method with shape restrictions based on commonly reported experimental
findings in the literature.
7 Specifically, Kessler and Vesterlund (2015) argue that it is widely accepted, even among critics, that laboratory experiments
tend to have qualitative external validity. On the other hand, researchers need to be cautious in interpreting specific quantitative
findings of lab experiments to have broad external validity. Nevertheless, Kessler and Vesterlund (2015) also note that there is
value in quantitative estimates if they are used as an intermediate step to facilitate investigations of qualitative regularities.
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Note: A bidder category is assigned at the beginning of the experiment run, and a participant never changed his/her category throughout an experiment run.
Table 1: Numbers of Bidders and Bids
Bidder Number of Symmetric-Auction Asymmetric-Auction
Category Participants Stage Bids Stage Bids
Experiment Run I
Joint 16 Bidders 192 Bids 192 Bids
¨
˝
96 chosen-then-announced bids
96 compatibility-condition-adapted bids
˛
‚
Solo 8 Bidders 96 Bids 96 Bids
Experiment Run II
Joint 12 Bidders 144 Bids 144 Bids
¨
˝
72 chosen-then-announced bids
72 compatibility-condition-adapted bids
˛
‚
Solo 6 Bidders 72 Bids 72 Bids
Aggregated Run (Run I and II)
Joint 28 Bidders 336 Bids 336 Bids
¨
˝
168 chosen-then-announced bids
168 compatibility-condition-adapted bids
˛
‚
Solo 14 Bidders 168 Bids 168 Bids
2 Data Descriptions
In this section, we illustrate the laboratory auction data used to obtain the results described in the em-
pirical section. The key feature of the data is that bidders in experiments participated in two exogenously
varying auction formats while the majority of their valuations remained unchanged. With the emphasis
on such exogenous change, we first describe the laboratory auction procedures, then explain the summary
statistics for illustrating differences in bidding behavior before and after the exogenous auction format change.
The data is from Chernomaz (2012), which investigates the results of joint bids in independent private
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value first-price auctions.8 The participants were undergraduate students at the Ohio State University and
were paid a $6 show-up fee. The participants were from a wide range of social science majors and did not
have much previous experience in auction bidding: a detailed description of auction procedures was provided
to participants, as described below.9
A computer-based laboratory was used for this experiment, and participants interacted exclusively through
computer screens. By using random computer-generated numbers, valuations of an object were exogenously
and randomly assigned to bidders. At the beginning of each experiment run, bidder categories (joint and solo)
were randomly assigned, and every participant remained the same category (either joint or solo) through-
out the experiment run. We define a solo-category bidder as one who was not allowed to change valuation
in the transition between symmetric- and asymmetric-auction stages within a round. On the other hand,
we define a joint-category bidder as one who aggregated valuations (with the other joint-category bidder
in a matched group) before an asymmetric-auction stage mid-round. At this point, participants were pro-
vided with a detailed explanation of experiment procedures, including: value distribution, valuation-drawing
method, group-matching rule, valuation-aggregation method for joint-category bidders in an asymmetric-
auction stage, auction rules, result-announcement timing and contents, winner determination rule, monetary
payoff methods, and, crucially, the unchanged nature of bidder categories.
The structure of the entire experiment was as follows: there were two experiment runs (I and II) con-
ducted on different days, and the participants were not allowed to join more than one experiment run.10 In
each experiment run, there were two practice rounds without monetary payment and twenty-four rounds with
monetary payments. In each round, there were several stages, including symmetric- and asymmetric-auction
stages, as described in Figure 1. The format was therefore (an experiment run) Ą (a round) Ą (a stage).
Table 1 summarizes the number of participating bidders and bids used in this research in each experiment run.
8 A joint bid (also known as a consortium bid) is defined as two or more bidders who form a group and submit one joint bid
in an auction. Joint bids were allowed in Mexico and Louisiana Gulf Outer Continental Shelf (OSC) wildcat auctions, and as a
result the implications of joint bids are now intensively investigated in the empirical auction literature, e.g. Hendricks and Porter
(1988), Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003), and Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003). Note that our laboratory procedures in
Figure 1 can be viewed as a miniature hypothetical wildcat auction, in which both (non-collusive) individual and joint bids are
permitted and the auctioneer randomly determines whether or not to allow a joint bid. One of the conclusions in Chernomaz (2012)
is that qualitatively bidders follow theoretical predictions by changing their bidding behavior between symmetric and asymmetric
environments. Additionally, bidders with the weaker (solo) valuation distribution tend to be pointwise more aggressive, as the
theory predicts.
9It is worth emphasizing that risk attitudes were not elicited as part of the experiment. However, the design of the experiment
allows us to estimate the revealed risk attitudes by comparing bids for the same valuation but in different bidding settings: symmetric
vs. asymmetric.
10 Chernomaz (2012) conducted one more experiment run. However, in the middle of that run, one subject elected to leave and
had to be replaced with a substitute subject. To avoid any resulting issues, such as discrepancies in bid distributions and bidders’
risk averse attitudes in structural estimations, we omit this experiment run from our analyses. See page 708 of Chernomaz (2012)
for details.
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At the beginning of each round, participating bidders were randomly matched to form three-bidder groups.
Within a group, two bidders were joint-category players, and the remaining one was a solo-category player.
Then, valuations were drawn from the uniform distribution for each bidder, vi
i.i.d.
„ FV pviq “
1
18.75vi, where
vi P r$0, $18.75s, denoted by v1 for a joint-category bidder; v2 for another joint-category bidder; and v3 for a
solo-category bidder, as depicted in Figure 1.
As mentioned above, there were symmetric- and asymmetric-auction stages within each round. In the
symmetric-auction stage, three bidders submitted one bid each (denoted as b1, b2, and b3), though the
outcome of a symmetric-stage auction was not announced until the result-announcement stage.
Next, at the beginning of an asymmetric-auction stage, the two joint-category bidders aggregated their
valuations as max tv1, v2u “ vJoint. Accordingly, valuations among joint-category bidders are distributed as
max tv1, v2u “ vJoint
i.i.d.
„ FVJointpvJointq “
1
p18.75q2 v
2
joint where vJoint P r0, 18.75s. This method of value aggre-
gation, adopting a maximum valuation among joint-category bidders, is motivated by empirical observations
that joint bidders share their economic resources. Such resources include: the best available cost-saving
technology; the closest geographical locations; and information on the best-available resale opportunities.
In an asymmetric-auction stage, a solo-category bidder submitted a bid bSolo, based on his valuation of
v3. On the other hand, each joint-category bidder submitted a respective bid, based on the aggregated
valuation of vJoint “ max tv1, v2u. At this point, the two joint-category bidders were informed of their ag-
gregated valuation (i.e. max tv1, v2u) through their respective computer screens. However, verbal or textual
communication between joint-category bidders was forbidden. Therefore, a bid made by a joint-category
bidder in an asymmetric-auction stage (i.e. b1,Joint or b2,Joint in Figure 1) was derived from a single-agent
payoff-maximization problem. Furthermore, these two joint-category bids (denoted as b1,Joint and b2,Joint)
were separately submitted by each joint-category bidder; then the auctioneer (i.e. experiment organizer)
randomly chose one of them with equal probability (described as 50% and 50% in Figure 1) to be the chosen
joint-category bid.
At the result-announcement stage, results within a matched group, including assigned valuations (v1, v2,
and v3), aggregated valuation (max tv1, v2u), bids in each stage (b1, b2, b3, chosen bJoint, and bSolo), and win-
ning/losing statuses in each stage, were announced to the matched group members. However, the identities
of bidders were kept hidden.
In addition, monetary payoffs were calculated and added to each participating bidder’s account. Mone-
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tary payoffs were calculated as follows. After a result-announcement stage, the auctioneer randomly selected
(with equal probability) an auction stage in which an outcome was actually paid. Note that since bidders’
vNM functions are additively separable, which is usually assumed and accepted in auction literature, this
random selection does not affect bidders’ payoff-maximization problems in each auction stage.11 A winner of
a symmetric-auction stage was the bidder who submitted the highest bid, and a winning payoff is vi´bi where
i P t1, 2, 3u. In an asymmetric-auction stage, shown in Figure 1, the outcome for a solo-category bidder was
determined by comparing bsolo and chosen bjoint. On the other hand, the outcome for the first joint-category
bidder was determined by comparing b1,joint and bsolo, while the outcome of the second joint-category bidder
was determined by comparing b2,joint and bsolo.
12 Lastly, at the end of each round, the matched group was
dissolved, and participants returned to the pool of bidders.13
Regarding the shared information among bidders, the auction results of each round were announced only
to matched-group members at the end of each round, and the results of a specific matched group were not
available to members of any other group. As a natural consequence, we observe sizable learning and adjusting
behavior in the first half of the rounds in each experiment run. For investigating the strategic interactions
and estimates of valuations without concern for the learning effect and strategic uncertainty, the rest of this
research excludes the data from the first half of the rounds. As the standard structural auction estimation
methods deal with bidding data from a non-learning environment, we use the bid data from the second half
of each run, in which the the effect of learning behavior is considered to be negligibly small.14
As bid data are used (i) for calculating distributional functions and (ii) for constructing compatibility condi-
tions, we need a careful classifications of asymmetric-auction stage bids submitted by joint-category bidders.
The first class is called (i) chosen-then-announced bids. Bids in this class were chosen by the auctioneer with
the 50%-50% random choice rule, then they were announced in a result-announcement stage as described in
11 This randomized selection process was empirically motivated by the factual observation of timber auctions, in which the
U.S. Forest Service randomized different auction rules. Lu and Perrigne (2008) and Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011) exploit such
randomization of timber auctions for detailed investigations of identifications and bidding behavior.
12We can compare our three-bidder symmetric auctions to the similar three-bidder auctions reported in Bajari and Hortaçsu
(2005) (originally reported in Dyer et al. 1989). In their study the, the average observed bid is about 24 percent higher than the
average risk-neutral equilibrium bid. In contrast, the average observed bid in the symmetric stage of Chernomaz (2012) is about
16 percent higher than the risk-neutral equilibrium. The three-bidder case is only one of the treatments in the within-subjects
designs of both studies. In the other treatments of Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005), the bids are expected to be relatively higher due
to an increased number of bidders, while in the other treatments of Chernomaz (2012) bids are expected to be relatively lower
due to a reduced number of bidders. The difference in overbidding under different treatments is also consistent with the idea that
subjects’ bidding errors would be biased in the predicted direction of the additional treatments. Moreover, procedural differences,
such as revelations of values at the end of the bidding round to all subjects in Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005), could have important
implications for deviations from the equilibrium.
13After an asymmetric-auction stage, Chernomaz (2012) further conducted a communication-based asymmetric-auction stage in
which within-a-group joint-category bidders were allowed to exchange textual messages via computers. In this study, we eliminate
the communication-based asymmetric-auction stage data to focus our analyses on the single-agent payoff maximization problems.
14The experimentally assigned valuations (i.e. true valuations) and observed bids are plotted in the Online Appendix section 1.
10
Figure 2: Venn Diagram of Asymmetric-Auction Stage Joint-Category Bids
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Figure 1. The second class is called (ii) compatibility-condition-adapted bids. These bids are made by joint-
category bidders whose valuations did change in the transition between symmetric- and asymmetric-auction
stages. In Figure 1, a bid made by a joint-category bidder who had a valuation of v “ max tv1, v2u falls
into this class [class (ii)]. Figure 2 and Table 2 explain the categorization and usage of asymmetric-auction
stage bid data submitted by joint-category bidders. As the participants were informed of (i) the chosen-then-
announced bids, we later estimate distributional functions of asymmetric-auction stage joint-category bids
based on chosen-then-announced joint-category bids (depicted as the solid-line circle in Figure 2). On the
other hand, when we construct compatibility conditions with exogenous variations of auction formats, we
use (ii) compatibility-condition-adapted bids (depicted as the broken-line circle in Figure 2). This is because
compatibility conditions, which will be explained in the estimation section, require a consistent valuation
across different auction formats. In contrast to asymmetric-auction stage bids submitted by joint-category
bidders, we use all asymmetric-auction stage bids submitted by solo-category bidders both for distributional
function estimations and for compatibility condition constructions.
Lastly, Table 3 lists the summary statistics of symmetric-auction stage and asymmetric-auction stage bids.15
Here, the asymmetric-auction stage bids are compatibility-condition-adapted ones on which we later construct
compatibility conditions. At the majority of bid quantiles, both joint- and solo-category bidders decreased
their bids in asymmetric-auction stages compared to symmetric-auction stages.
15In our dataset, similar to other experimental auction studies, overbidding relative to the risk-neutral equilibrium bidding
functions is observed (see Table 2 and 3 of Chernomaz 2012), and degrees of risk aversion can in part explain this pattern. In
addition, it is worth emphasizing that divergence from fully rational behavior, such as deviations from best responding actions
(with various risk attitudes) can be in play as well.
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Table 2: Asymmetric-Auction Stage Joint-Category Bid Data Categorization and Their Usage
Class Description Usage / Estimating Object
(i) Chosen-then-announced bids
Asymmetric-auction stage joint-category bids
Distributional functionsthat were chosen then announced
by auctioneer
(ii) Compatibility-condition-adapted bids
Asymmetric-auction stage joint-category bids made by bidders
Compatibility conditionswho did not change valuations (in the transition
between symmetric- and asymmetric-auction stages)
Note: Non-(chosen-then-announced) bids are discarded in distributional function estimations. Also, asymmetric-auction stage joint-category bids made by the
bidders who changed valuations in the transition between symmetric- and asymmetric-auction stages are excluded in the construction of compatibility conditions.
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Bid Data (in U.S. Dollars)
Bidder Sample Auction Mean Standard Quantile
Category Size Stage Deviation 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Experiment Run I
Joint
192 Symmetric 9.54 3.75 5.00 6.28 9.99 12.40 14.98
96 Asymmetric 9.58 3.95 4.75 6.76 9.28 12.34 15.00
Solo
96 Symmetric 6.79 4.60 1.02 2.58 6.69 11.06 12.96
96 Asymmetric 6.92 4.64 0.75 2.56 7.22 10.93 13.75
Experiment Run II
Joint
144 Symmetric 10.60 4.30 3.16 7.55 11.49 14.18 15.79
72 Asymmetric 10.22 4.39 3.16 7.38 11.25 13.64 15.63
Solo
72 Symmetric 8.52 4.88 2.03 4.53 8.61 12.78 15.27
72 Asymmetric 8.43 4.85 2.03 4.53 8.31 12.75 15.08
Note: Asymmetric-auction stage joint-category bids reported here are compatibility-condition-adapted bids.
3 Auction Models
This section describes the models of independent private value (IPV) auctions. We first explain the symmetric
auction model that is a straightforward application of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), Guerre, Perrigne,
and Vuong (2009), and Campo, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2011). We then illustrate a simplified version
of the asymmetric auction model that was originally proposed by Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003).
3.1 Symmetric Auction Model
A single and indivisible object is sold in an auction to bidders who have the von-Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) function Up¨q that is twice differentiable with U 1p¨q ą 0 and U2p¨q ď 0 to allow potential risk aversion.
The normalization of Up0q “ 0 and Up1q “ 1 is imposed without loss of generality. In our experiment,
there are N “ 3 bidders in an auction with index i P t1, 2, 3u. Each bidder draws a private valuation vi
from the i.i.d. distribution FV pviq. Given that other bidders employ a symmetric equilibrium strategy φp¨q,
expressed as an inverse bidding function, bidder i’s expected payoff maximization problem is max
bi
Upvi ´
biq ¨ FY´ipφpbiqq, where Y´i is a random variable of the highest valuation among opponent bidders with its
realization y´i “ maxj‰i vj , and FY´ip¨q is the distribution function of Y´i. We denote λp¨q ” Up¨q{U
1p¨q
and λ´1p¨q as the corresponding inverse function. We also define B´i as the random variable of the highest
bid among opponent bidders with its realization b´i “ maxj‰i bj . In addition, we denote the distribution
of B´i as GB´ipb´iq and its derivative as gB´ipb´iq. We henceforth refer to the argument of the mark-
down function as the R factor or R function. Based on Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009), by denoting
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the R factor as Rrx|GB´i , gb´is “ GB´ipxq{gB´ipxq, we can write the first-order necessary condition as
vSymi “ b
Sym
i `λ
´1
´
RSym
”
bSymi
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
GSymB´i , g
Sym
B´i
ı¯
, where the superscript of “Sym” emphasizes that the auction
model is symmetric.
3.2 Asymmetric Auction Model
We next introduce the asymmetric auction model. We henceforth focus on the simplest environment, a two-
category and two-bidder asymmetric auction, on which our experimental asymmetric auction data is based.
We define the index of the bidder category as t P tJoint,Solou. We use a convenient notation of ´t for
representing the opponent bidder’s category (note: bidders never changed their categories throughout the
experiment). A category t bidder draws a private valuation from a distribution FVtpvtq. Also, we denote
Utp¨q as a vNM function of category t bidder, as we allow for the possibility of joint- and solo-category
bidders having different payoff functions. In this research, we estimate heterogeneous (yet within-category-
homogeneous) payoff functions UJointp¨q and USolop¨q separately. By denoting an inverse bidding function
as φ´tp¨q, the expected payoff maximization problem is max
bt
Utpvt ´ btq ¨ FV´tpφ´tpbtqq, where FV´tpv´tq
denotes the distribution function of V´t, the valuation of the opponent-category bidder. Simiar to the
symmetric case, we used the notations of λtp¨q ” Utp¨q{U
1
tp¨q and λ
´1
t p¨q. We denote the distribution of
the opponent’s bid B´t as GB´tpb´tq and its derivative as gB´tpb´tq. Lastly, by denoting the R factor as
Rrx|GB´t , gB´ts “ GB´tpxq{gB´tpxq, we can write the first-order necessary condition as v
Asym
t “ b
Asym
t `
λ´1t
´
RAsym
”
bAsymt
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
GAsymB´t , g
Asym
B´t
ı¯
, where the superscript of “Asym” emphasizes that the auction model is
asymmetric, and which is the simplified version of the framework proposed by Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong
(2003).
4 Structural Estimation Methods
In this section, we describe the estimation methods for recovering valuations. Estimation procedures are
summarized in three steps: Step 1 – nonparametrically estimating distribution functions; Step 2 – by ap-
plying semi or nonparametric methods, estimating mark-down functions (i.e. λ´1t p¨qs); Step 3 – estimating
valuations based on estimated distribution functions and mark-down functions. As the main purpose of this
study is to investigate the accuracy of asymmetric auctions estimates, we primarily recover valuations from
bids observed in asymmetric auctions, and bid data from symmetric auctions is used solely for the purpose
of semi and nonparametrically estimating mark-down functions.
By following the literature, we nonparametrically estimate the distributional and density functions. We
use the triweight uni-variate kernel with Silverman’s rule of thumb bandwidths. Regarding the bids sub-
mitted by joint-category bidders in asymmetric-auction stages, we use the chosen-then-announced bids for
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estimating distributional functions, as these are the bids that were actually announced to the bidders in
experimental runs (see Table 2). In addition, we exploit the anonymous nature of our experiment: a bidder
did not know opponents’ identities in each auction. This enables us to aggregate the distributional functions
against which a bidder is best responding. The distributional functions are estimated in a standard fashion.
Specifically, we use bandwidths of hSymg “ cg ¨ pRMNq
´1{5 and hAsymg “ cg ¨ pRMq
´1{5, where R is the number
of experiment rounds, M is the number of matched groups, and N “ 3 is the numbe of bidders. Also, we use
cg “ 3.156 ¨ σ̂b, and σ̂b is the empirical standard deviation of corresponding observed bids.
The estimated kernel density functions play an important role for calculating R functions. However, the
well-known drawback of the standard KDE is the boundary problem. This problem prevents consistent es-
timation at the boundaries (as well providing underestimations in near-boundary domains) and is a major
empirical concern. Indeed, it is observed that the R factor at the right tail of the bid distribution often has
quite a large number, as it is generated by dividing a positive number by a number close to zero, tending
to result in the inflated estimates of valuations. To overcome the boundary problem, Hickman and Hubbard
(2015) applied the method of boundary correction to the structural asymmetric auction estimation frame-
work. Accordingly, throughout this study, we apply the boundary correction methods for all estimates.
Lastly, as a baseline model, we benchmark the risk-neutral model with the preference of Utpxq “ x and
the mark-down function λ´1t pyq “ y. Accordingly, we have the following estimates pv
Asym
RN,r,m,t “ b
Asym
r,m,t `
RAsym
”
bAsymr,m,t
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
pGAsymB´t , pg
Asym
B´t
ı
for each category of t P tJoint,Solou.
4.1 Semi & Nonparametric Estimations of Risk Averse Models
In empirical auctions, the assumption of risk neutrality is justified when a bidder can be seen as a large firm
whose wealth is large relative to the value of an object under auction. However, in reality, bidders could
be risk averse, and they may sacrifice extra payments to increase the probability of winning. In such situa-
tions derived model implications could be substantially different from those from the risk neutral model.16
In Step 2, we use quantile restrictions to derive compatibility conditions, which are used for semi and non-
parametrically estimating the mark-down functions. We now introduce the notation for bSymi,α to denote the
αth quantile for the distribution of observed symmetric-auction stage bids and bAsymt,α for that of observed
asymmetric-auction stage bids submitted by category t bidders. Similarly, we use vi,α as αth quantile of value
distribution in symmetric-auction stages and vt,α as that of value distribution among category t bidders in
asymmetric-auction stages. Then, we have the quantile notations of the equilibrium first order condition
16 The empirical evidences and estimates of risk averse preferences in first-price auctions are reported by Lu and Perrigne (2008),
Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011), and Campo, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2011) in their investigations of timber auctions and
Campo (2012) in her study of construction contract auctions. Specifically, these empirical investigations emphasize risk averse
preferences among small-size firms.
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Figure 3: Data Construction for Compatibility Conditions
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Note: This figure is a continuation of Figure 1 (Stages within a round). We here assume v1 “ max tv1, v2u without loss of generality.
Compatibility-condition-unadapted bids, like those submitted by Bidder 2 in this figure, are not used for computing bid quantiles used in
compatibility conditions.
for the symmetric-auction model as vSymi,α “ b
Sym
i,α ` λ
´1
´
RSym
”
bSymi,α
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
GSymB´i , g
Sym
B´i
ı¯
and for the asymmetric-
auction model as vAsymt,α “ b
Asym
t,α ` λ
´1
t
´
RAsym
”
bAsymt,α
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
GAsymB´t , g
Asym
B´t
ı¯
.
Next, by exploiting the fact that the majority of bidders in experiment runs did not change their valua-
tions in the transition between symmetric- and asymmetric-auction stages mid-round (as depicted in Figure
1), we take advantage of the observed differences between bids across auction stages, which are summarized
in Table 3. As the valuations of a solo-category bidder and one of the joint-cagegory bidders were unchanged
in both stages, we have the equivalence of valuations, vSymi“t “ v
Asym
t with the notation of i “ t for each
category of t P tJoint,Solou, meaning that we restrict our attention to category t bidders, who ddid not
change their valuations. Notably, compatibility-condition-unadapted bids (e.g. bSym2 and b
Asym
2,Joint submitted
by Bidder 2 in Figure 3, whose valuation was changed mid-round) are not used for the construction of the
compatibility conditions discussed below. Then, by exploiting the unchanged nature of valuations, we match
the quantiles of bidders’ private value distribution as vSymi“t,α “ v
Asym
t,α , where v
Sym
i“t,α and v
Asym
t,α denote the αth
quantiles of category t bidders’ value distribution. Thus, for each category t P tJoint,Solou, we can equate
the equilibrium first order condition equations. Then, we have the following compatibility condition equation:
bSymi“t,α ´ b
Asym
t,α “ λ
´1
t
´
RAsym
”
bAsymt,α
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
GAsymB´t , g
Asym
B´t
ı¯
´ λ´1t
´
RSym
”
bSymi“t,α
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
GSymB´i , g
Sym
B´i
ı¯
, (1)
where we use the notation of bSymi“t,α for the αth quantile of observed bids made by category i “ t bidders in
symmetric-auction stages. For estimations, we use the data on bid quantiles
!
bSymi“t,αq
)
q“0,¨¨¨ ,Q
and
!
bAsymt,αq
)
q“0,¨¨¨ ,Q
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that are quantile points of observed bid distributions, and Q is the number of quantile points.17 Given the
quantiles of bid distributions, in Step 2, equation (1) can be estimated by the semi and nonparametric
methods for obtaining pλ´1t p¨q. Then, in Step 3, by plugging the observed bids and estimated objects from
Step 1 and Step 2 in the first order necessary condition, we can obtain the estimates of valuations as18
pvAsym “ bAsym ` pλ´1t
´
RAsym
”
bAsym
ˇ
ˇ pGAsymB´t , pg
Asym
B´t
ı¯
.
4.1.1 Semiparametric Estimation for CRRA Model
Based on Campo, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2011), we now apply the preference of constant relative
risk averse (CRRA) vNM functions Utpxq “ x
θt for t P tJoint,Solou. We have the mark-down function,
λ´1t pyq “ θt ¨ y. Then, in Step 2, the compatibility condition equation (1) with estimated distributional
functions ( pGs and pgs) becomes pbSymi“t,α ´
pbAsymt,α “ θt ¨
!
pRAsymB´t
”
pbAsymt,α
ı
´ pRSymB´i
”
pbSymi“t,α
ı)
, where we use the
shorthand notations for simplicity. Then, with the standard OLS assumptions, we can apply the OLS
estimation to this equation for obtaining pθt. Subsequently, in Step 3, we obtain the semiparametric CRRA
model estimates of valuations through the first-order condition equation. We apply the bootstrap method
for obtaining the standard error of pθts.
4.1.2 Nonparametric Estimation Model
Finally, we estimate the nonparametric vNM function model that is introduced by Guerre, Perrigne, and
Vuong (2009). Despite the fact that certain classes of payoff functions (e.g. CRRA) have been proposed
and applied in empirical research, there is neither a consensus among researchers nor definitive criterion
regarding which class of payoff functions accurately describe the bidding behavior. Hence, an extension to
nonparametric specification is essential, as it allows the greatest degree in modeling mark-down and payoff
functions. Specifically, for nonparametric estimations, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009) provide a non-
parametric identifiation result based on a recursive construction of quantile points, yet they also indicate
the potential problems of serial correlations and accumulated error terms in such a recursive construction.
Since a recursive construction is difficult to apply in practice, they suggest sieve as an alternative estimation
method for empirical applications.
Based on the alternative estimation method suggested in their research, we use the sieve method to esti-
mate the mark-down functions λ´1t p¨q P Λ
´1, where Λ´1 is a set of differentiable and strictly monotonically
increasing functions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first applied auction work using their non-
parametric sieve framework for estimating risk averse preferences with observed bid data. In practice, as we
normalize a vNM function, we impose the theoretical restrictions of λ´1t p0q “ 0 and 0 ă
d
dRλ
´1
t pRq ď 1.
17 See Online Appendix section 2 for a detailed description of quantile point constructions.
18 Once we estimate pλ´1t p¨q, we can analytically or numerically recover a payoff function pUtpxq by solving the differential equation
of pλtpxq “ pUtpxq{pU
1
tpxq with the normalized initial condition of pUp0q “ 0, leading to the solution of pUpxq“expr
şx
1 1{
pλpzqdzs.
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As emphasized by Matzkin (1994), Matzkin (2007), and Chen (2007), there are several advantages of such
economic-theory-based shape restrictions in empirical analyses, such as credible extrapolations beyond the
support of data. Accordingly, we will later exploit shape restrictions. Furthermore, we choose Λ´1 as the set
of polynomial functions Polpy; ηt,Kq “
řK
k“1 ηt,k ¨ y
k without intercept terms, where ηt,K stands for a coeffi-
cient vector of Kth order polynomial. In addition, a polynomial order K flexibly changes in polynomial sieve
space.19 Then, in Step 2, as polynomials are linear in their coefficients, the compatibility condition equation
(1) becomes
pbSymi“t,α ´
pbAsymt,α “
K
ÿ
k“1
ηt,k
"
´
pRAsymB´t
”
pbAsymt,α
ı¯k
´
´
pRSymB´i
”
pbSymi“t,α
ı¯k
*
. (2)
Under this polynomial specification, Λ´1 becomes a linear space, and we can solve the minimization problems
by the least square method with the bid quantile data. Additionally, we need a criterion function for selecting
the order of polynomial terms. For selecting pηt among the estimates of
!
pηt,Kmin , pηt,Kmin`1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pηt,Kmax´1pηt,Kmax
)
,
we adopt the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1998). Subsequently, in Step 3, we obtain the non-
parametric estimates of valuations using Equation (2).
For implementation purposes, the empirical challenge of this sieve estimation method is that, in practice,
applied researchers are only able to identify λ´1p¨q on limited domains which are away from boundaries.
This limitation mainly comes from two facts: (a) we estimate a nonlinear mark-down function λ´1p¨q, not
by applying a nonlinear-recursive-projection estimator but by applying a linear difference estimator based
on Equation (2), in which empirical researchers face difficulties in obtaining accurate R factors due to the
boundary problem; and more importantly (b) after taking a difference, empirical researchers are able to es-
timate λ´1p¨q function on a truncated domain of R factors, while they are technically required to use λ´1p¨q
on the full domain of r0, Rmaxs for recovering valuations.
20
To overcome these issues, we use shape restrictions on sieve polynomial estimations, which are frequently
suggested in the nonparametric estimation literature.21 Specifically, conventional-wisdom-based bounds on
the slopes of λ´1t p¨q functions are employed on boundary domains of R factors. Note that, with these shape
restrictions, we are still able to exploit data variations on the domain, where the differences in the right-side
of Equation (2) (i.e.
´
pRAsymB´t
”
pbAsymt,α
ı¯k
´
´
pRSymB´i
”
pbSymi“t,α
ı¯k
) are available.
In the next section, we report the sieve estimation results based on the following three types of shape
19 In programming, we choose the minimum and maximum number of polynomial terms as Kmin “ 5 and Kmax “ 15 for
achieving flexibility in the polynomial sieve space.
20See Figure 3 in the Online Appendix section 3.
21See Matzkin (2007) pp. 5352 for an example.
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restrictions on R functions: (1) minimalistic slope restrictions based only on economic theory (called min-
imalistic shape restrictions), which are λ´1p0q “ 0 and 0 ă ddyλ
´1pyq ď 1; (2) shape restrictions based on
common lower bounds of slopes among solo- and joint-category bidders (called common shape restrictions);
and (3) shape restrictions based on differentiated lower bounds of slopes (called differentiated shape restric-
tions) which incorporate heterogeneous risk attitudes and framing effects across bidder categories that are
frequently reported in both the empirical and experimental auction literature.22 The technical note in the
Online Appendix section 3 provides the details and computational implementations of these shape restrictions.
5 Estimation and Test Results
This section reports the results of estimations and statistical tests under various modeling assumptions. As
the purpose of this study is investigating the accuracy of asymmetric auction estimates, we analyze estimates
of valuations derived from the asymmetric models. First, we graphically describe laboratory-assigned true
valuations and estimated valuations. Then, we statistically test their distributional equivalence. Regarding
the model specifications on vNM payoff functions, we start with the risk neutral model. Then, we discuss
risk-averse models starting with CRRA, followed by nonparametric models with various shape restrictions.
Lastly, we compare estimated and true market efficiencies. The Online Appendix section 4 and 5 list L1 and
L2 distance norms between estimated and true valuations, as well as estimated density functions.
5.1 Estimation Results
The estimation results are plotted in Figures 4 to 8, which depict laboratory-assigned true valuations on
the horizontal axis and estimated valuations on the vertical axis. For measuring the deviations from true
valuations, a 45-degree line is added. Also, for creating equally-scaled figures (so that a 45-degree line is
tilted exactly at 45 degrees), the estimated valuations are censored from above at $30. Note that a few of
the estimated valuations, especially ones derived from the risk neutral model, exceed $100.
First, we discover the severe over-estimation of asymmetric auction estimates with the risk neutral model
depicted in Figure 4. Thus, our result confirms a similar finding detected in the symmetric auction model
reported by Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005); the existence of asymmetry among bidders does not change the
over-estimation of the risk neutral model.
The estimated valuations derived from the semiparametric CRRA model are plotted in Figure 5. Also,
the OLS estimates of risk averse parameters, θts, are reported in Table 4 with 95% bootstrapped confidence
22See the empirical evidence of Campo (2012) and the experimental investigation of Holt and Laury (2002) for such heterogeneous
risk preferences and framing effects.
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intervals.23 For both categories of bidders, and in both experiment runs, the degrees of the Arrow-Pratt rel-
ative risk measures (1´ θt), revealed by submitted bids, are remarkably large in this laboratory experiment,
an observation that is frequently reported in other experimental auction studies. Our results report pros and
cons of the semiparametric estimation method. As pros, the problem of over-estimation is largely resolved,
and estimated valuations among solo-category bidders lie relatively close to the 45 degree line. However,
we now also have noticeable systematic under-estimation among joint-category bidders.24 In addition, the
95% bootstrapped confidence intervals of CRRA parameter are wide, which indicates the unstable nature
of resulting valuation estimates. The Online Appendix section 5 reports the density estimates based on the
CRRA model estimated valuations with 95% sub-sampled bounds, and this instability is manifested by the
wide subsampled bounds.
Lastly, we progress to the nonparametric sieve estimation results. The estimates are plotted in Figure 6
(with minimalistic shape restrictions based on auction theory), Figure 7 (with conventional-wisdom-based
common shape restrictions), and Figure 8 (with differentiated shape restrictions). We observe that the
problem of systematic under-estimation among joint-category bidders is improved, supporting the empirical
usefulness of the shape-restricted nonparametric sieve estimation method, assessed by L1 measure, listed in
the Online Appendix section 4.
5.2 True and Estimated Valuations - Test for Distributional Equivalence
In this subsection, to test the statistical equivalence between true and estimated value distributions, we use
the Modified Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (henceforth MKS) that is proposed by Haile, Hong, and Shum
(2003) and extended by Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005).
The Modified Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for category t P tJoint,Solou bidders is calculated as follows:
MKSt “
?
RM sup
vPrv‹,v‹s
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
1
RM
R
ÿ
r“1
M
ÿ
m“1
1 tpvr,m,t ď vu ´ Ftpvq
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
,
where Ftpvq is a known distribution of drawn valuations in our experimental auction data. As a reminder,
r P t1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Ru is an auction round index and m P t1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Mu is a within-a-round matched group index.
Also, v‹ and v
‹ are strictly bounded away from boundaries. As the asymptotic normality of MKS statistics
is not yet known in the literature, and based on the proofs provided by Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003) and
23 In Table 4, we list the estimation results with boundary corrections. The estimation results without boundary corrections
can be provided upon request. Regarding the bootstrap, we re-sample 1000 times for calculating confidence intervals. Note that, if
we affine-transform the CRRA vNM function into the well-known form of Upxq“ x
1´ν´1
1´ν
, the negative values in the 95% confidence
bounds could be interpreted as extreme risk aversion.
24Such systematic under-estimation is also found in semiparametric estimates of symmetric auctions in Bajari and Hortaçsu
(2005) when the number of bidders is large.
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Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005), we consider subsampling by using the following smooth analogue for computing
the nondegenerate asymptotic distribution,25
ČMKSt “
?
RM sup
vPrv‹,v‹s
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
1
RM
R
ÿ
r“1
M
ÿ
m“1
Λ ppvr,m,t ´ vq ´ Ftpvq
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
,
where Λpxq “ 1´ψpxh q with a bandwidth parameter h and ψp¨q is a smooth and strictly monotonic distribu-
tion function. The auction econometrics literature has proven uniform consistencies under various models on
the support that is strictly bounded away from boundaries.26 Accordingly, under the null of a correct model
specification, the sup distance between smoothed and true distribution converges to zero.
For generating an approximate distribution, we draw S subsamples from the observed bids. Theoretically
speaking, we could draw all combinatorics of κS “ RMCS unique subsamples. However, in computation, it is
not practically feasible to compute all RMCS combinations. For this reason, we set the subsampling draw size
of κS “ 600.
27 The subsampling distribution Φtpxq for ČMKSt of category t P tJoint,Solou is approximated by
Φtpxq “
1
κS
κS
ÿ
l“1
1
#
?
S sup
vPrv‹,v‹s
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
1
S
S
ÿ
s“1
Λ
`
pvls,t ´ v
˘
´ Ftpvq
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ď x
+
.
To increase statistical power, we further aggregate the estimated valuations after each method of structural
estimation (denoted as “Aggregated Run” in Table 5), and analyze the test results of the Aggregated Run.
The test results are listed in Table 5 with a five percent significance level. In the table, “YES” displays
that the distributional equivalence is rejected, while “NO” indicates non-rejection at the significance level of
five percent. At the Aggregate Run level, the distributional equivalence in the risk neutral model is strongly
rejected for joint-category bidders at the one percent level but not rejected for solo-category bidders at the
ten percent level. However, the p-values of risk-neutral model solo-category estimates within each experiment
run (0.112 and 0.103) are close to the ten percent rejection level, suggesting that empirical researchers should
consider the usage of more advanced risk-preference models. Next, by applying the CRRA semiparametric
model, we fail to reject the distributional equivalence among solo-category bidders. On the other hand, al-
though they are improved when compared to those in the risk neutral models, estimates among joint-category
bidders still do not attain equivalence at the ten percent, indicating the need for further improvements. Lastly,
25 See the Appendix of Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005) for the proof of non-degenerating asymptotic distribution.
26 Note that ČMKSt Ñ MKSt as h Ñ 0. As in Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005), we choose h “ 1 in our subsampling computation.
Also, we set the domain of sup operator as rv‹, v
‹
s “ r$4.6875, $16.237s where v‹ “ $4.6875 corresponds to the 25th quantile of
solo-category bidder value distribution, while v‹ “ $16.237 approximately corresponds to the 75th quantile of joint-category bidder
value distribution.
27 In computation, we set S “ 36 for Experiment Run I and S “ 27 for Run II, which are 37.5% of RM in each experiment run.
Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1999) prove that, under the null, if S Ñ 8 and S
RM
Ñ 0 as RM Ñ 8, this approximation provides a
consistent estimate of true sampling distribution.
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by applying the nonparametric sieve estimations, at the Aggregate Run level, we fail to reject distributional
equivalences, for both bidder categories, at the five percent level when conventional-wisdom-based common
shape restrictions and differentiated shape restrictions are applied. Thus, conventional-wisdom-based shape
restrictions are empirically shown to help to achieve higher accuracy.
In summary, these distributional equivalence tests confirm that researchers attain higher accuracy when
they use more advanced semi and nonparametric econometrics, providing an experimental support for the
auction estimation methods developed in recent years.
5.3 Efficiency Assessment of Asymmetric Auctions
In empirical asymmetric auction research, the assessment of efficiency in an auction market is of central
interest for market design. The key question is whether efficiency recovered from the structural estimations
is useful in practice. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to report the accuracy in structurally
estimated auction market efficiencies.
Table 6 summarizes and compares the true and estimated efficiencies with the boundary correction method.
The table shows that the recovered efficiencies are within 2.5% difference from the true efficiency (at the
Aggregated Run level) in the risk-neutral, nonparametric common shape restrictions, and nonparametric
differentiated shape restriction models. As a note, CRRA and nonparametric minimalistic shape restriction
models underestimate the efficincies, mostly due to the underestimation of valuations among joint-category
bidders as shown in Figures 5 and 6. The new and somewhat surprising finding here is that the primitive risk
neutral model, which does not require exogenous variations, recovers the accuracy within 2.5% range from
true efficiency at the Aggregated Run level. These findings confirm the empirical usefulness of asymmetric
structural auction methods for the purpose of assessing market efficiency.
Figure 4: Risk Neutral Model Figure 5: Semiparametric CRRA Model
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Figure 6: Nonparametric Model -
Minimalistic Shape Restrictions
Figure 7: Nonparametric Model -
Common Shape Restrictions
Figure 8: Nonparametric Model -
Differentiated Shape Restrictions
Table 4:
OLS Estimates of CRRA Risk-Averse Parameters (Utpxq “ x
θt)
with Boundary Corrections
Bidder Category CRRA: θ̂t
Experiment Run I
Joint 0.053 (-0.051, 0.199)
Solo 0.060 (-0.794, 0.455)
Experiment Run II
Joint 0.040 (-0.041, 0.190)
Solo 0.173 (-0.192, 0.338)
Note: The parentheses indicate bootstrapped 95 % confidence intervals.
22
Table 5: True versus Estimated Valuations - Test for Distributional Equivalence
(Reject Distributional Equivalence at 5% Level? YES (Rejected); NO (Not Rejected)
Bidder Risk Neutral Semiparametric Nonparametric: Nonparametric: Nonparametric:
Category CRRA Minimal. Shape Common Shape Differen. Shape
Restrictions Restrictions Restrictions
Experiment Run I
Joint
4.899*** (0.000) 2.960*** (0.008) 3.266*** (0.000) 1.939** (0.043) 1.021 (0.275)
YES YES YES YES NO
Solo
1.939 (0.112) 1.531 (0.525) 0.816 (0.700) 0.816 (0.490) 0.816 (0.678)
NO NO NO NO NO
Experiment Run II
Joint
3.182*** (0.002) 2.239** (0.018) 2.357*** (0.002) 1.061 (0.440) 0.825 (0.497)
YES YES YES NO NO
Solo
2.239 (0.103) 0.825 (0.555) 0.943 (0.453) 0.589 (0.867) 0.825 (0.578)
NO NO NO NO NO
Joint
5.786*** (0.000) 3.163*** (0.007) 3.472*** (0.000) 2.006* (0.052) 0.694 (0.717)
Aggregated Run YES YES YES NO NO
(Run I and II, aggregated
Solo
2.623* (0.052) 1.620 (0.450) 0.694 (0.802) 0.772 (0.607) 0.694 (0.773)
after value estimations) NO NO NO NO NO
The parentheses indicate a p-value. Modified Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics are calculated on r$4.6875, $16.237s.
*** indicates the rejection at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
Table 6: Assessment of True versus Estimated Efficiencies
True Risk-Neutral Semiparametric Nonparametric: Nonparametric: Nonparametric:
Efficiency CRRA Minimal. Shape Common Shape Differen. Shape
Restrictions Restrictions Restrictions
Experiment Run I
85.42% 89.58% 76.04% 75.00% 81.25% 84.37%
(+4.17%) (-9.38%) (-10.42%) (-4.17%) (-1.04%)
Experiment Run II
90.28% 90.28% 81.94% 81.94% 91.67% 95.83%
(˘0.00%) (-8.33%) (-8.33%) (+1.39%) +(5.56%)
Aggregated Run (Run I and II, 87.50% 89.88% 78.57% 77.98% 85.71% 89.29%
aggregated after value estimations) (+2.38%) (-8.93%) (-9.52%) (-1.79%) (+1.79%)
The parentheses indicate the gap from the true auction market efficiency.
Figure 9: Comparison between Experimental and Field Auctions
Strategic Intricacies 
(similar to this experimental auction research) 
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6 Conclusion
To address the precision of structural auction estimates, this research provides laboratory evidence to support
the accuracy of asymmetric first-price auction estimates. We provide new statistical evidence by conducting
distributional equivalence tests between the estimated and true valuations. Also, we show that the usage of
risk averse semi and nonparametric estimation methods leads to nonnegligible improvements in asymmetric
auction estimates, and that advanced estimation techniques, in general, achieve higher accuracy. Although
the degree of such improvement will differ by applications, the fact of improvement is generalizable to other
empirical auction research.
Finally, the external validity of our results to other auctions must be addressed. We acknowledge that
getting a good estimation result in one specific auction environment does not guarantee that researchers
will get a similar result in other situations. However, one can deduce conservative yet practical insights by
contrasting our experimental auctions with field auctions. Experimental auctions differ from field ones in at
least three ways: (i) the strategic intricacies of auctions; (ii) bidder sophistication; and (iii) bidder motivation
due to monetary stakes. The discussion below, as depicted in Figure 9, breaks down (i) into two parts (i.e.
low and high strategic intricacies compared to this research), then examines the generalizability of our results
regarding (ii) and (iii).
Asymmetric auctions with high/advanced strategic intricacies (right hand side of Figure 9, shaded area):
If an environment of empirical asymmetric auction research is more intricate than the one we have discussed
in this study, such as endogenous and strategic participation in auctions or binding reserve prices, our results
have restricted external validity on the accuracy of estimates. Bidders who face such high degrees of strategic
intricacies may behave differently from what we observe in our experiment. Further investigation on the
accuracy of estimates derived from experimental data, or any field data that directly or indirectly contains
information about underlying valuations, will extend the results of this study for such auctions.
Asymmetric auctions with low (or similar) strategic intricacies (left hand side of Figure 9): In our ex-
perimental asymmetric auctions, the participants were undergraduate students who lack real-world business
experience, so their degree of strategic sophistication is reasonably assumed to be lower than bidders in the
real-world business industry (i.e. low degree of (ii)). In addition, as the monetary stakes in our experiment
are relatively low compared to the stakes observed in real-world auctions, the associated monetary motivation
among bidders in the laboratory is also expected to be low (i.e. low degree of (iii)). However, the positive
finding of this research is that the structural estimates derived from bids, submitted by strategically unso-
phisticated and less financially motivated bidders, are statistically shown to be distributionally equivalent.
Therefore, we can deductively translate the accuracy of estimates reported in this research into the estimates
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generated from professional industry bidders in field auctions for the following reasons: first, professional
bidders must have a high degree of strategic sophistication in order to survive industry competition (i.e. high
degree of (ii)), and secondly, as monetary stakes in real-world auctions are high, the associated monetary mo-
tivations among industry bidders are also high (i.e. high degree of (iii)). It stands to reason that, compared
to our experiment participants, such professional bidders are more likely to recognize underlying strategic
interactions in auctions as prescribed by BNE and less likely to make optimization errors (or less likely to
engage in irrational behavior). Accordingly, because structural estimations are based on BNE, the estimates
derived from such sophisticated and considered bids are likely to be more accurate than those reported in this
research. Thus, we deduce that, as long as the strategic intricacy of an underlying asymmetric auction market
is not vastly different from the one discussed in this research, and as long as industry bidders are maximizing
expected payoffs, what holds accurate in our laboratory auctions also holds accurate in a real-world industry
setting.
Lastly, we end this study by suggesting an avenue for further research. Due to their direct relevance to
market designs, empirical auction studies with entry decisions among potentially risk averse bidders are an
important area and are currently being actively investigated (see Gentry and Li 2014, Li et al. 2015, Gentry
et al. 2015, and Kong 2015). Another potential extension is learning, which is also actively researched these
days (see Nekipelov 2007 and Doraszelski et al. 2018), and which warrants further investigation. If researchers
observe long auction series with either true or proxy valuations, the modeling contribution of the learning
process could be explored. Experimental or field-experimental verifications of entry and learning models
could provide a solid foundation for auction market policy designs.
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